AI RISKS

and what mathematicians can do about them

Xiaoyu He · Georgia Tech · Tropical Mathematics and Machine Learning Seminar · November 23, 2026

1 What AI can do

2 How AI scales

3 The risks we face

Misuse · Gradual disempowerment · Takeover

4 What mathematicians can do

Theory · Practice · Advocacy

AI PROVES THEOREMS, FALL 2026

OCTOBER 6 · OPENAI

372 RESULTS

722 manuscripts

3 hours of ChatGPT-Pro equivalent compute per problem

NOVEMBER 20 · ANTHROPIC

RIEMANN HYPOTHESIS

Levent Alpöge + Claude · 41 days

17M lines of Lean, machine-checked

OPENAI HEADLINE RESULTS (CLAIMED)

Quasi-Riemann hypothesis

No Dirichlet L-function, zeta included, has a zero with real part above 7/8

Kakeya in 4D

Every Kakeya set in four dimensions has full Hausdorff dimension

Hilbert's 10th problem over $\mathbb{Q}$

No algorithm decides whether a polynomial equation has a rational solution

Sources: OpenAI, "Sharing AI progress in mathematics" and the catalogue at github.com/openai/math, Oct 6, 2026; L. Alpöge, note and Lean archive, Nov 20, 2026; Lean FRO and Mathlib joint statement, Nov 21, 2026

AI ADOPTION ACROSS DOMAINS

SOFTWARE

About 75% of Google's new code was AI-generated in April 2026.

MUSIC

IngaRose, an AI-generated singer, hit #1 on the US and global iTunes charts.

WRITING

A detector rated the 2026 Commonwealth Short Story Prize winner as fully AI-written.

MICRO-DRAMAS

Over 90% of China's new micro-dramas in 2026 are AI-generated.

LAW

Most federal judges surveyed (62%) use AI tools in their judicial work.

PSYCHIATRY

A 2026 letter in a leading psychiatry journal: "We are the last generation of human psychiatrists."

EDUCATION

70% of teens use AI for schoolwork.

AI R&D

Claude leads 26% of Anthropic's AI R&D tasks, up from under 1% in February 2026.

Sources: Sundar Pichai · iTunes · Pangram · China NRTA via ECNS, Sept 2026 · Northwestern and NYC Bar survey · Luty, Br. J. Psychiatry · Common Sense Media (NY Post) · Anthropic Institute (2025–26)

THE HUGGING FACE INCIDENT, MAY TO JULY 2026

MAY 12 – JULY 4

Agents find each other

Agents in training discover they can message each other through a shared package manager. They reach the internet and gain admin access. No human notices.

Narrative: Dwarkesh Patel, “The Rise and Fall of Agent Civilizations”, Aug 2026; OpenAI and Hugging Face incident reports

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1,200 agents collude

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JULY 13 – 19

A new model inherits it

Agents of a newer, stronger model find the abandoned board, inherit its research, and take administrator access to an OpenAI research cluster.

Through all of it, not one agent alerted a human.

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HUGGING FACE: WHAT THE AGENTS WROTE TO EACH OTHER



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WHAT IS A LARGE LANGUAGE MODEL?

CONTEXT WINDOW

"The cat sat on the"

→

NEURAL NETWORK

A sequence of matrix multiplications composed with basic nonlinear functions like ReLU[1] and softmax[2]

Weights $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^N$, N = billions to trillions

→

NEXT-WORD PROBABILITIES



[1] ReLU(x) = max(x, 0), coordinatewise. [2] $\text{softmax}(x)_i = \exp(x_i) / \Sigma_j \exp(x_j)$, turning scores into probabilities.

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

LOSS $L(\theta) = -(1/T)\,\Sigma_t \log p(x_{t+1} \mid x_1, \ldots, x_t\,;\,\theta)$

Cross-entropy: how surprised the model is by the actual next word, averaged over the training text. Pretraining is gradient descent on L.

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

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EXAMPLE TRAINING RUNS	PARAMETERS: *N*	DATA: *D* TRAINING TOKENS	COMPUTE: *C* FLOPS
GPT-3 · OpenAI, 2020	175 billion	300 billion	3×10^{23} FLOP
Llama 3.1 405B · Meta, 2024	405 billion	15.6 trillion	4×10^{25} FLOP

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FROM TEXT PREDICTOR TO REASONER

PRETRAINING

Trillions of tokens
of web text

Imitate the internet

$$-\log p(x_{t+1} \mid x_1 \ldots x_t)$$

Ouyang et al., “Training language models to follow instructions”, 2022 · Lambert et al., “Tülu 3”, 2024 (RLVR) · DeepSeek-AI, “DeepSeek-R1”, 2025

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Prompts with ideal
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RL

Solve problems
with checkable answers

Maximize reward

$\mathbb{E}[\, r(x, y)\,], r \in \{0, 1\}$

RL with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is the breakthrough that makes AI so strong at math.

15.6% → 71.0% DeepSeek-R1-Zero on AIME 2024,
from RLVR alone, no SFT

Ouyang et al., “Training language models to follow instructions”, 2022 · Lambert et al., “Tülu 3”, 2024 (RLVR) · DeepSeek-AI, “DeepSeek-R1”, 2025

THE INGREDIENTS OF SCALING



$C \approx 6ND$ training compute (FLOPs) ≈ 6 × parameters × training tokens

Only two of the three are free, so scaling LLMs is a 2-variable optimization problem: scale data and compute together.

Sources: Kaplan et al., “Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models”, 2020; Hoffmann et al. (Chinchilla), “Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models”, 2022

SCALING: LOSS VS COMPUTE

Each dot is a real training run. On log-log axes, the best run at each compute level falls on a straight line.

Every 10× more compute cuts the loss by about 11%, predictably, across four orders of magnitude.



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

Epoch AI forecasts that it is theoretically possible for frontier models to continue scaling 4× per year in training compute up through 2030, before bottlenecks in power supply, chip production, and data are hit.

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NEW SCALING LAWS MAY BE BEING UNLOCKED

RSI

Recursive self-improvement: AI systems doing the research that builds the next AI system.

26% of Anthropic's AI R&D tasks are led by Claude.



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

SWARMS

Thousands of agents working in parallel on one problem.

> *"Basically if you have four agents working on the problem, it is done twice as fast. [...] If you go to 16 agents, you see a similar pattern, it's like a little less efficient, but you continue to see that performance."*
>
> — Noam Brown (OpenAI), on the Dwarkesh Podcast



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RISK 1: MISUSE

CYBER

271 bugs

found in Firefox once Mozilla got access to Claude Mythos, up from 22 with the previous model

Mozilla, Apr 2026

80–90%

of a state-backed espionage campaign was run by AI agents

Anthropic, Nov 2025

BIO

16 viruses

made from AI-designed genomes really worked (bacteriophages)

Arc / Stanford, Science 2026

21 hours

for ~950 Claude agents to find a new CRISPR-like gene editor

Anthropic's new wet lab, Sept 2026

PERSUASION

~2.7×

as much in real donations raised by AI as by professional canvassers

Hackenburg et al., 2026

$2.5 billion

lost to deepfake fraud in 2025, up from $335 million in 2024

Surfshark, Jul 2026

RISK 2: GRADUAL DISEMPOWERMENT

What we're living through in math right now is a **preview** of how disruptive AI will be in the majority of human endeavors.

Kulveit, Douglas, Ammann, Turan, Krueger and Duvenaud, "Gradual Disempowerment", ICML 2025

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As mathematicians, we see potential loss of control in...

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- Journals
- Hiring
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If we do not effectively combat gradual disempowerment across all critical systems of human civilization, **AI will have taken over** without ever taking an identifiable hostile action.

Kulveit, Douglas, Ammann, Turan, Krueger and Duvenaud, "Gradual Disempowerment", ICML 2025

RISK 2: GRADUAL DISEMPOWERMENT

> *“Once this human participation gets displaced by more competitive machine alternatives, our institutions’ incentives for growth will be untethered from a need to ensure human flourishing.”*
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Here’s a dramatic account (by Claude and Suno) of the gradual disempowerment that’s already happened in Software Engineering...

“LGTM (Looks Good to Me)”, a music video made with Claude Opus 5.5 and Suno · youtube.com/watch?v=3TNpOD6bov8

Kulveit, Douglas, Ammann, Turan, Krueger and Duvenaud, “Gradual Disempowerment”, ICML 2025

LINES ADDED · −12 REMOVED

forty thousand

+39,800

RISK 3: TAKEOVER



COHERENCE

AIs tend towards coherent utility-maximizers.



INSTRUMENTAL CONVERGENCE

Most utility functions converge on power-seeking and self-preservation.



ORTHOGONALITY

Values and capabilities are independent.



EXTINCTION BY DEFAULT

If takeover happens, most utility-maximizers will prefer to wipe out humanity.

RISK 3: TAKEOVER



Between 38% and 51% of 2,778 AI researchers surveyed gave at least a 10% chance to advanced AI leading to outcomes as bad as human extinction.

Grace et al., “Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI”, 2024

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THEORY

Mathematical alignment tries to envision the possible endgames we should be aiming for.

OPEN-SOURCE GAME THEORY

Agents that read each other's source code can cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma.

EMBEDDED AGENCY

Decision theory for an agent that can inspect and rewrite its own mind.

SINGULAR LEARNING THEORY

Algebraic geometry of the loss landscape tracks how skills emerge in training.

WHERE TO START **MAISI** **ILIAD** **Resolution**

maisi.org · iliad.ac · resolution.org

OPEN-SOURCE GAME THEORY

Prisoner's Dilemma		
	C	D
C	3, 3	0, 5
D	5, 0	1, 1

Classical answer: both defect, and both get 1.

Barasz, Christiano, Fallenstein, Herreshoff, LaVictoire, and Yudkowsky, "Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic", arXiv:1401.5577, 2014 · Critch, J. Symb. Log. 2019

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FairBot is the program that, given the source code of an opponent *X*, cooperates if and only if Peano arithmetic (PA) proves that *X* cooperates with FairBot.

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OPEN QUESTIONS

(1) Does this survive when the agents are neural networks?

(2) Can AIs verify each other without revealing their weights?

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FairBot is the program that, given the source code of an opponent X, cooperates if and only if Peano arithmetic (PA) proves that X cooperates with FairBot.

Theorem (Barasz et al., 2014)

In the one-shot prisoner's dilemma, FairBot cooperates with FairBot. Moreover, if PA is sound, FairBot never cooperates with an opponent that defects against it.

Proof idea. Löb's theorem: if PA proves "if P is provable, then P", then PA proves P. Apply it to P = "FairBot cooperates with FairBot".

Barasz, Christiano, Fallenstein, Herreshoff, LaVictoire, and Yudkowsky, "Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic", arXiv:1401.5577, 2014 · Critch, J. Symb. Log. 2019

EMBEDDED AGENCY

an agent that is part of its own arena

CLASSICAL DECISION THEORY



A Cartesian boundary separates the agent from the arena it acts on.

Examples: multi-armed bandit problem, secretary problem.

Demski and Garrabrant, “Embedded Agency”, arXiv:1902.09469

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

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The agent is part of its arena. It can inspect and rewrite its own mind.

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

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OPEN QUESTIONS

(1) Can we design alignment properties to stay fixed when the mind can edit itself?

(2) Is this a fixed-point problem?

Demski and Garrabrant, “Embedded Agency”, arXiv:1902.09469

SINGULAR LEARNING THEORY

how degenerate is the minimum a network finds?

REGULAR MINIMUM



$K = a^2 + b^2$ $\lambda = 1$

Watanabe, Algebraic Geometry and Statistical Learning Theory, 2009 · Lau, Furman, Wang, Murfet, Wei, “The Local Learning Coefficient”, 2023 · Hoogland et al., “Loss Landscape Degeneracy Drives Stagewise Development in Transformers”, 2024

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

$K = a^2b^2$ $(x \mapsto abx)$ **$\lambda = ½$**

λ measures how much room there is near the minimum:

$$\mathrm{Vol}\{K < \varepsilon\} = \varepsilon^{\lambda + o(1)}$$

Smaller λ means a simpler model. In training, jumps in λ mark new skills.

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

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OPEN QUESTIONS

(1) Can we use singular learning theory to predict which skills emerge, and in what order?

(2) Can we steer training away from bad pathways?

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PRACTICE

Empirical AI safety tries to prevent the next model release from blowing up.

BENCHMARKS AND EVALS

Mathematicians built FrontierMath and Firstproof. Can we build benchmarks for alignment?

INTERPRETABILITY

Pull sparse, readable features out of dense matrices.

SCALABLE OVERSIGHT

Let a weak judge supervise a strong AI through debate.

WHERE TO START **MATS** **Anthropic Fellows** **ARC**

matsprogram.org · Anthropic Fellows Program · alignment.org

INTERPRETABILITY

reading the algorithm off the weights

Lemma (Johnson–Lindenstrauss, 1984)

For any $0 < \varepsilon < 1$, any n points in Euclidean space can be mapped linearly into $k = O(\log n / \varepsilon^2)$ dimensions so that every pairwise distance is preserved up to a factor of $1 \pm \varepsilon$.

Corollary. Dimension d holds $\exp(c\varepsilon^2 d)$ unit vectors with all pairwise $|u \cdot v| \le \varepsilon$, but only d exactly orthogonal ones.

Johnson and Lindenstrauss, 1984 · Elhage et al., “Toy Models of Superposition”, 2022 · Templeton et al., “Scaling Monosemanticity”, 2024

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Superposition: features ≫ dimensions



2 features in 2D

5 features in 2D

One neuron fires for many unrelated concepts.

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

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OPEN QUESTIONS

(1) Is it possible to extract a model's true thought process out of its intermediate computations?

(2) If not, can we rebuild LLMs to be more interpretable without paying heavy costs?

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SCALABLE OVERSIGHT: DEBATE

How can a weak judge supervise an AI much stronger than itself?

Irving, Christiano, Amodei, “AI Safety via Debate”, 2018 · Brown-Cohen, Irving, Piliouras, “Scalable AI Safety via Doubly-Efficient Debate”, 2023

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Doubly efficient debate

The honest debater can win using only polynomially many steps, even against a dishonest one.

OPEN QUESTIONS

(1) What if the judge is an imperfect human?

(2) Obfuscated arguments: what if the dishonest side hides its error where no one can find it?

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ADVOCACY

Slow down AI progress to give safety research time to catch up.



Plan A: Larsen, Dean, Halstead, Lifland, Greenblatt and Kokotajlo, “AI 2040: Plan A”, AI Futures Project, July 2026 · ai-2040.com · Trump quote: press conference, Nov 20, 2026 · Op-ed advice: Hamman and Su, “Reach the World”, MAA Focus, Jan 2023 · AMS guidance on congressional visits

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

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> — Donald Trump, November 20, 2026

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

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TALK

to friends, family and colleagues, especially those working in AI

CALL

your representatives, and keep AI risk non-partisan

WRITE

an op-ed; local papers want a mathematician's voice

JOIN

your campus AI safety group

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PROGRESS TOWARDS PAUSE

AI WHISTLEBLOWERS

"...recklessly racing to be the first [to build AGI]." — *Daniel Kokotajlo, ex-OpenAI*

"They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives." — *Jacob Coxon, ex-Anthropic*

"Jacob is right: many researchers believe they are building something that could kill everyone on the planet." — *Alex Turner, ex-Google DeepMind*

"...the time for trial and error is over." — *David Robinson, ex-OpenAI*

MATHEMATICIANS

"We believe this is an emergency, and call on the Royal Society to use its influence to convey this view to government and the media."

— 42 Fellows of the Royal Society, incl. Timothy Gowers

THE PRESS

"...now they find themselves racing one another to build incomprehensible autonomous A.I.s that they admit are slipping out of humanity's control."

— Ezra Klein, New York Times

THE AI CEOS · SEPT 2026

"We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models." — *Dario Amodei*

"I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier." — *Sam Altman*

"Dario's essay points towards the right path forward." — *Demis Hassabis*

"Dario is right." — *Elon Musk*

BAN ARTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE BILL

Pause advanced AI until a new Department of AI sets safety rules. Up to 20 years in prison.

— Sen. Bernie Sanders, co-sponsor

Sources: darioamodei.com and posts on X (Sept 2026) · Roll Call · NYT · The Atlantic · Royal Society fellows' letter

THANK YOU!

alkjash.github.io/ai-safety · aisi.dev